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AFTERWORD: THE FINAL ACO RULE
Edward Correia*
CMS issued its final rule for Accountable Care Organizations ("ACOs")
and the Shared Savings Program ("SSP") on November 2, 2011. CMS
reported that it received over 1,300 comments on its proposed rule and stated
that it was "encouraged by the level of engagement by stakeholders." 2 That
is a positive way of describing comments that were overwhelmingly
negative. 3 However, CMS gets credit for making a number of revisions in
its original proposal in order to make the program more attractive. Whether
these modifications are significant enough to make the program successful
remains to be seen. There are good reasons to believe that the program still
does not offer strong enough incentives to make it attractive to many Health
Care Organizations ("HCOs"). 4
Adjunct Professor, American University Washington College of Law. The author may
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1. See Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. 425).
2. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 67,804.
3. For an overview of the proposed rule, including potential problems, some of
which have been addressed by the final rule, see Correia, The Proposed Regulations and
Prospects for Success, 17 AM. J. OF MAN. CARE 31, 37 (2011); see also Douglas
Hastings, The Medicare ACO Proposed Rule: Legal Structure, Governance, and
Regulatory Sections, HEALTHAFFAIRS.ORG (Apr. 5, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2011/04/05/the-medicare-aco-proposed-rule-legal-structure-govemance-and-
regulatory-sections/.
4. I use the term HCOs to refer to any health care organization that integrates
different types of care, ranging from a simple single hospital-single physician group
arrangement to large Integrated Delivery Networks ("IDNs") that include dozens of
hospitals of hundreds of affiliated physicians. As a practical matter, it is likely that only
large, highly integrated HCOs can benefit from the ACO program.
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Overview of Changes
CMS summarized the major changes in the rule as follows:5
(1) greater flexibility in eligibility to participate in the SSP
(2) multiple start dates in 2012
(3) establishment of a longer agreement period for those starting in
2012
(4) greater flexibility in the governance and legal structure of an
ACO
(5) simpler and more streamlined quality performance standards
(6) adjustments in the financial model to increase financial
incentives to participate
(7) increased sharing caps
(8) no down-side risk and first-dollar sharing in Track 1
(9) removal of the 25 percent withhold of shared savings
(10) greater flexibility in timing for the evaluation of shared
savings
(11) greater flexibility in antitrust review
(12) greater flexibility in timing for repayment of losses
(13) additional options for participation of Federal Qualified
Health Centers ("FQHCs") and Rural Health Clinics ("RHCs").
Of these, the most significant are those that increase the financial
incentives to participate in the program-(6) through (9) above, changes in
the quality performance standards, revisions in the antitrust review process,
and the increased flexibility in governance and legal structure. The
comments below focus on these provisions to the original proposal.
Financial Incentives in the Final Rule
The central concept of the ACO program is that financial rewards to
HCOs can be structured to encourage HCOs to reduce Medicare
expenditures for an identified group of beneficiaries while maintaining or
improving quality. The trick is to provide those incentives without
encouraging HCOs to deny needed benefits and reduce quality of care-the
problems that plagued many managed care organizations in the 1970s and
1980s. The ACO program bases these financial rewards on the difference
between actual Medicare expenditures and baseline expenditures, which are
determined by reviewing the expenditures of the same pool of beneficiaries
5. See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final
Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,804.
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in a previous three year period.6 This concept is maintained, with a few
adjustments, in the final rule.
The proposed rule included a number of limitations on shared savings,
which, taken together, significantly reduced the financial attractiveness of
the program. The final rule makes a number of changes that eliminate or at
least modify these provisions. Financial incentives differ depending on
whether an ACO is structured under "Track 1" or "Track 2." These
changes are summarized in the proposed rule.8 They include the following:
Eliminating the Shared Loss Provision for "Track 1" ACOs
The proposed rule provided that ACOs in "Track 1" would share losses
beginning in the third year, i.e., if the Medicare expenditures exceeded the
benchmark, the ACO would have to reimburse Medicare a portion of the
amount by which average costs exceeded the benchmark.9 This created the
risk that an ACO would actually lose money rather than benefit by
participating in the program.'o Under the proposed rule, an ACO could even
experience a 100% shared loss rate depending on its quality performance."
The concept of shared losses was retained for ACOs in "Track 2" but the
final rule places a cap of 60% on the shared losses.12 For example, if
Medicare expenditures exceeded the benchmark by $300 per beneficiary, an
ACO subject to 60% shared loss rate would have to reimburse CMS $180
per beneficiary. The final rule also places a cap on shared losses for "Track
2" ACOs of 5% in the first year, 7.5% in the second year and 10% in the
third year.13 For example, if the benchmark is $10,000 and the ACO's
6. Id. at 67,851.
7. The Track 1 or "one sided" model is the lower-risk, lower-reward model. The
Track 2 or "two sided" model provides for higher rewards but also includes the risk of
shared losses. Id. at 67,904.
8. Id. at 67,909-10.
9. Id. at 67,937.
10. Id.
11. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 67,937.
12. Id. at 67,909-10.
13. Id.
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expenditures exceed the benchmark by $1,000, a 5% cap would mean that
the ACO only has to reimburse CMS $500.
Shared Savings and the Minimum Savings Rate ("MSR")
The original rule provided that, in order to be eligible for any shared
savings, ACOs were required to reduce expenditures by a minimum amount
below the benchmark. Depending on the number of beneficiaries, the MSR
for "Track 1" ACOs ranged from 2.0% to 3.9%.14 The MSR for "Track 2"
ACOs was pegged at a flat 2.0%.'1 The original rule also provided that
"Track 2" ACOs could share in savings from the "first dollar" as long as
their savings exceeded the 2.0% minimum MSR standard. However, "Track
1" ACOs could share in savings based only on the savings beyond the 2%
minimum. A number of commenters argued that this provision made it even
more difficult for "Track 1" ACOs to obtain shared savings. The final rule
retains the sliding scale MSR for "Track 1" ACOs and the flat 2% MSR for
"Track 2" ACOs. However, the final rule allows "Track 1" ACOs to share
in first dollar savings, once savings meet or exceed the MSR.17
Shared Savings Rate
The sharing rate is the percentage of savings that is retained by the ACO.
For example, if the average Medicare expenditures by ACO beneficiaries are
$1000 less than the benchmark, and the sharing rate for the ACO is 60%, the
ACO is paid $600 per beneficiary. The proposed rule provided that the
maximum shared saving rate for "Track 1" ACOs was 52.5% and 65% for
"Track 2" HCOs, if FQHCs or RHCs participated in the ACO. The final
rule eliminates this bonus for FQHC and RHC participation and caps the
shared savings rate at 50% for "Track 1" HCOs and 60% for "Track 2"
ACOs. '
14. Id. at 67,927-29.
15. Id. at 67,929.
16. Id.
17. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 67,934.
18. Id. at 67,930.
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Eliminating the 25% Withhold
The proposed rule provided that CMS would withhold 25% of shared
savings to ensure that it would be reimbursed for shared losses. This
provision meant that ACOs would experience lower reimbursement rates
while CMS waited to see if they had to participate in shared losses. This
rather draconian provision was eliminated. 9
Legal Structure and Governance
One of CMS's goals in designing the ACO program is to encourage the
creation of HCOs that are responsive to the patient population and other
constituencies, such as participating providers. Consequently, the proposed
rule included a number of provisions regarding the legal structure and
governance. Traditionally, large corporations are controlled by a board of
directors, chosen by shareholders in the case of for-profit corporations and
chosen in some other way, e.g., by the directors themselves, in the case of
non-profit corporations. There is no requirement that service providers
affiliated with the organization are represented on the board, although they
may be. In for-profit corporations, there is traditionally no "proportionality"
requirement, except perhaps for those related to equity investments. For-
profit corporate governance principles have evolved over a long period and,
in theory at least, strike a balance between accountability to shareholders
and freedom for directors to exercise sound business judgment. Arguably,
requiring a particular form of governance as a condition of participating in
the ACO program creates additional barriers to participation and runs the
risk that these non-traditional forms of governance may be inefficient and
cumbersome.
The final rule dropped some governance requirements but it maintained
others. It dropped the requirement that each ACO participant have
"proportionate" control over the ACO governing body.20 This requirement
was hard to meet as a practical matter; it also created the risk that certain
participants, e.g., physician groups, could dominate the ACO at the expense
of other constituencies and overall efficiency. In addition, the final rule
dropped a requirement that the ACO require representation on the governing
body of particular categories of providers and suppliers.21 The final rule
requires that the ACO provide "meaningful participation in the composition
19. Id. at 67,942.
20. Id. at 67,818.
2 1. Id.
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and control of the ACO's overning body for ACO participants or their
designated representatives." Depending on how it is interpreted, this
standard could provide considerable flexibility in creating governance
structures, but it also creates the risk that constituencies who do not feel
adequately represented will complain to CMS or seek some other remedy.
The final rule also maintains a requirement that 75% control of the ACO's
governing body must be held by the ACO's participants.23 Without a
proportionate control requirement-which presents its own problem-this
75% requirement could be met by giving a narrow category of participants,
e.g., specialty physician groups, 75% of the director seats on the ACO's
board. In general, it seems quite possible that CMS's attempt to impose
governance rules on ACOs will accomplish little and cause a considerable
amount of complexity and conflict within the organizations.
Quality Performance Standards and Shared Savings
The proposed rule included very demanding quality performance
standards in two ways. First, the proposed rule included 65 different
standards. 24 Second, CMS proposed that ACOs could receive the maximum
shared savings only if they achieved 100% complete and accurate reporting
on all quality measures. 2 5 The combination of this large number of quality
measures and the requirement to achieve an acceptable score on all these
measures made the quality performance standards very daunting.
Many commenters argued that the large number of standards were
confusing and duplicative.26 The final rule reduces the number of standards
to 33.27 If the patient experience survey requirements, the diabetes-related
measures, and the Coronary Artery Disease ("CAD") measures are each
counted as one standard, there are only 23 scored quality measures. 28 This
22. Id. at 67,818.
23. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 67,821.
24. Id. at 67,871.
25. Id. at 67,896.
26. Id. at 67,802.
27. Id. at 67,871.
28. Id.at 67,891.
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modification simplifies the qualifying performance analysis and makes it
easier for ACOs to evaluate and report their performance. In addition, the
final rule modifies the minimum 2erformance requirement to 70% of the
measures in each of four domains.2 The minimum attainment level for each
measure is 30% of a national standard or the 30th percentile of the Medicare
Fee-for-service or Medicare Advantage level of performance. 30
Antitrust and Marketing Review
The proposed rule reflected CMS's concern about potential harm to
competition if participants in an ACO constituted a large market share of a
relevant market. In particular, CMS is concerned that ACOs may reduce
competition, particularly in geographic areas, by coordinating the pricing
and services of a large percentage of a particular category of providers, such
as hospitals or physicians in a particular specialty. In addition, CMS is
worried that ACOs might use deceptive marketing materials or market their
services so as to attract only low-risk, low-cost beneficiaries. As a result,
CMS proposed that certain ACOs would have to undergo an advance
antitrust review and that all ACOs would have to submit marketing materials
to CMS for advance approval.
It is important to remember that federal and state antitrust laws and
consumer protection statutes will continue to apply to the providers in an
ACO and to the ACO itself These advance approval requirements would
have had the effect of placing a greater regulatory burden on ACOs than that
imposed on other types of businesses that raise an equal or greater risk of
harm to competition and consumers. In addition, the advance approval
requirements raised the potential for expensive and time-consuming analyses
by ACOs as well as the federal agencies required to review their
submissions. Consequently, many commenters advocated dropping these
mandatory review requirements or least restricting their scope.
The final rule drops the requirement of mandatory reviews altogether and
provides for an expedited voluntary review.32 CMS does promise to work
closely with the antitrust agencies to ensure that ACOs do not reduce
29. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 67,898.
30. Id at 67,899.
31. Id. at 67,946-47.
32. Id. at 67,842.
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competition.3 3 The final rule also drops the requirement of advance
approval of marketing materials.34  However, the final rule still requires
ACOs to submit marketing materials and activities five days before their
use. 3 5 If CMS does not object, these marketing materials and activities are
deemed to be approved.36
Conclusion
CMS clearly listened to commenters and made a genuine effort to modify
the ACO program to make it more attractive. Unfortunately, the final rule is
not likely to reduce significantly the structural barriers to the program's
effectiveness. Most fundamentally, the financial incentives to the ACO
itself and, even more importantly, to individual physicians, are probably too
small to make a significant difference in the way large integrated providers
operate.
The ACO program is a worthwhile attempt to increase the efficiency of
certain HCOs that find the program fits with their particular circumstances.
However, it is unlikely, on its own, to "bend the cost curve" or lead to major
changes in the way HCOs operate. It is one reform among many that are
underway in the health care system as a result of provider efforts as well as
cost containment policies by private payers and by CMS itself. These larger
trends will play a more significant role in driving the behavior of integrated
health care organizations than the ACO program itself.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 67,947-48.
35. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations; Final Rule,
76 Fed. Reg. at 67,947.
36. Id.
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